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European Political Cooperation After the Single
European Act: The Future of Foreign Affairs in
the European Communities
by Daniel T. Mw-phy*

l.

INTRODUCTION

The Single European Act (SEA) 1 consists of two ostensibly unrelated sets of
provisions, both of which are intended to contribute to unification among
members of the European Communities.2 Perhaps the major, and most widely
publicized, provisions of the SEA consist of amendments to the Treaty of Rome
(EEC Treaty).3 The remaining provisions of the SEA, predominately title III,

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Law School, University of Richmond, Virginia.
1 Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 29 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987) [hereinafter SEA].
The SEA entered into force july 1, 1987 after the last instrument of ratification, that of the Republic
of Ireland, was deposited. 29 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 169) 29 (1987). For a brief analysis of the SEA,
see Glaesner, The Single European Act: Attempt at Appraisal, 10 FoRo. INT'L. LJ. 446 (1987); Lonbay, The
Single European Act, 11 B.C. INT'L CoMP. L. REv. 31 (1988).
2 There is no doubt that unification is one of the purposes of the SEA. In the preamble the member
states note that in adopting the SEA they are:
[m]oved by the will to continue the work undertaken on the basis of the Treaties establishing
the European Communities and to transform relations as a whole among their States into a European
Union, in accordance with the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart of 19 June 1983 ....
SEA, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added).
The SEA has been criticized as a step backwards in the process of European unification. See
Resolution, 29 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 36) 144 (1986); Glaesner, supra note 1, at n.2; Pescatore, Some
Critical Remarks on the Single European Act, 24 CoMMON MKT. L. REV. 9 (1987).
'Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
The amendments to the EEC Treaty are the more widely publicized portion of the SEA. The most
important of these amendments is the provision setting December 31, 1992 as the deadline for the
completion of the internal market within the Community. In this market, all internal or national
barriers to the four Community-established freedoms-the free movement of goods, persons, services,
and capital-are eliminated. SEA, supra note 1, at title I, subsection II, arts. 13-15.
The SEA also alters the voting procedures of the Council of the European Communities (Council)
for certain regulations and directives, especially those necessary for the realization of the internal
market. See Glaesner, supra note 1, at 459-61. One effect of these reforms is to further weaken the
impact of the Luxembourg Accords. The Luxembourg Accords were an understanding of the member
states to agree that certain matters would not be put to a vote unless they enjoyed the unanimous
support of the members. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. This agreement is affected by a
provision allowing the adoption of certain additional regulations and directives by a qualified majority
of the member states in the Council. SEA, supra note 1, at title II, art. 16 (amending ar~cles 57(2), 59,
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formalize the system of European Political Cooperation (EPC) within the member states.4
Although not widely written about, or perhaps appreciated in this country,
EPC has become an efficient system for coordinating foreign affairs positions
within the European Economic Community (EEC).5 The EEC Treaty, as one of
its aims, fosters a closer political union among its member states.6 The framework of the EEC, however, does not fully provide the means for establishing a
political union. EPC was designed as an extra-treaty mechanism to facilitate
union in foreign affairs. Toward that end, the Community and its member
states have informally evolved EPC procedures over the last fifteen years. 7
In title III of the SEA, the member states have established a new system for
cooperation in foreign affairs. Although title III is not the dominant portion
of the SEA, the changes it makes in the EPC process are extremely significant.
Title III and the process it creates represent a continuation of the uniquely
70(1), and 84 of the EEC Treaty). Previously, these measures could be adopted only by the unanimous
vote of the Council. See generally D. LAsOK & j. BRIDGE, LAw AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
CoMMUNITIES 197-210 {4th ed. 1987).
The SEA also significantly enhances the role of the Parliament of the European Communities
(Parliament) in the Community's legislative process. See SEA, supra note 1, at title II, art. 7 (amending
article 149 of the EEC Treaty). Parliament now is afforded a role of cooperation in the adoption of
measures by the Council. The new procedures provide for cooperation from the Parliament in the
adoption of regulations and directives. Under these procedures, the Council will act by a qualified
majority on a proposal for a regulation or directive submitted to it by the Commission of the European
Communities (Commission) after receiving the opinion of the Parliament on the matter. Thereafter,
the action of the Council, together with a full explanation of the reasons for its action, are communicated to the Parliament. If the measure, as approved by the Council, is adopted by Parliament, or
Parliament takes no action on it, then it becomes effective. If Parliament rejects the measure, however,
the regulation or directive can become effective only if it is reapproved by the unanimous vote of the
Council. !d. See also D. LAsoK &J. BRIDGE, supra, 197-210; Glaesner, supra note 1, at 464-68; Edward,
The Impact of the Single Act on the Institutions, 24 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 19, 24-27 (1987); Bieber,
Pantalis & Schoo, Implications of the Single Act for the European Parliament, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
767 (1986).
In addition, the SEA adds several new substantive areas to the EEC Treaty. For example, as amended,
the EEC Treaty now contains provisions dealing with the convergence of the member states' economic
and monetary policies, improvement of the working environment, encouragement of cooperation in
research and technology areas with the aim of strengthening the basis of European industry, and
action by the Community on environmental matters. SEA, supra note 1, at title II, arts. 20, 21, 24, 25.
~SEA, supra note 1, at title III, art. 30.
5 See generally D. LAsOK &J. BruDGE, supra note 3, at 210-15; P. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN
CoMMUNITY LAw 253-55 (4th ed. 1985); Murphy, The System of European Political Cooperation: A Brief
Explanation, 10 N.CJ. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 383 (1985); Stein, Towards a European Foreign Policy? The
European Foreign Affairs System from the Perspective ofthe United States Constitution 60-78, in !INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAw: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, BooK 3 (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe
& J. Weiler eds. 1986) [hereinafter Stein]; Von der Gablentz, Luxembourg Revisited or the Importance of
European Political Cooperation, 16 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 685 (1979).
6 In the preamble to the EEC Treaty, the signatories state that they are "[d]etermined to establish
the foundations of an even closer union among the European peoples." EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at
15.
7 See infra notes 8-25 and accompanying text.
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ambivalent modus by which the member states have reached agreements in
foreign affairs in the past. Further, title III greatly enhances the status of EPC
in contributing toward European unification since its structure and process are
elevated to a series of treaty commitments. This change attests to the regard
that member states hold EPC and presumably to the role tliey intend it to play
in the future.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the pressures which led to the
change in EPC and to consider how this system will function in the future. This
Article begins with a discussion of EPC before the SEA and then reviews the
origins of title III and the SEA. Next, the Article analyzes the process of EPC
after the SEA. Finally, this Article considers the impact of the SEA on EPC in
the future.

II.

EuROPEAN PoLITICAL CooPERATION BEFORE THE

SEA

The structure and process of EPC, as they previously existed, were a set of
working relationships which evolved from declarations and communiques issued
following several meetings of member state leaders over the last two decades.
The most important of these documents is the Luxembourg Report8 issued in
1970 by the foreign ministers of the member states in response to the Hague
Communique.9 The Copenhagen Report, 10 issued in 1973, and the Paris Communique of the Heads of State and Government, 11 issued in 1974 at the conclusion of the Paris Summit, also discussed EPC. More recently, portions of the
London Report 12 and the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart13 have dealt with
EPC. The London Report reaffirms the earlier documents and refined EPC
procedures. The Solemn Declaration emphasizes the importance of coordination in foreign policy as a means of facilitating European union.
8 Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification, 3 BULL. EuR.
COMM. {No. 11} 9 {1970) [hereinafter Luxembourg Report].
9 Final Communique of the Conference of Heads of State or Government on I and 2 December 1969 at The
Hague, reprinted in, CoMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE EuROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1969, at 486 {1970). In this communique, the heads of
state and government acknowledged that great progress had been made in the development of
Community institutions and law. They instructed their foreign ministers to "study the best way of
achieving progress in the matter of political unification within the context of [an enlarged Community)." !d. at 489.
10 Political Cooperation Between the Nine, 6 BuLL. EuR. CoMM. {No.9) 12 {1973) [hereinafter Copenhagen
Report); see also COMMISSION OF THE EuROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE EuROPEAN CoMMUNmES 1973, at 502 {1974).
11 Meeting of the Heads of Government, 7 Buu.. EuR. CoMM. {No. 12) 6 {1974) [hereinafter Paris
Communique]; see also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE
AcTIVmES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1974, at 297 {1975).
12 Report on European Political Cooperation, 14 BuLL. EuR. CoMM. {Supp. 3) 14 {1981).
ts Solemn Declaration on European Union, 16 BuLL. EuR. COMM. {No.6) 24 {1983) [hereinafter Solemn
Declaration].
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As suggested in these documents, EPC consists of periodic meetings by government leaders, or their representatives, from the member states with the aim
of establishing common positions on issues of foreign policy. 14 A permanent
committee, the Political Committee, and specialized working groups assist the
government ministers in their work. In addition, civil servants of the member
states' foreign ministries have ongoing discussions regarding both preparation
for the meetings and implementation of decisions. This ongoing dialogue is
perhaps as important as the ministerial meetings. The aim of these meetings
and procedures is to enable the member states to coordinate their positions on
foreign policy matters. These EPC procedures have resulted in institutional
positions by the Community on matters of foreign affairs and have contributed
to a sense of a common European policy. 15
EPC is not an activity of the Community per se. There are no provisions
regarding EPC in the EEC Treaty, and the specific responsibilities of the EEC's
institutions, as stated in the constitutive documents, make no reference to it.
Nevertheless, EPC has become a convenient means for the Community, as an
entity, and for member states individually to address issues of common concern.16 In turn, this mechanism and the positions taken have contributed to a
sense of community among the members on non-economic matters. 17
Central to the EPC process is the European Council. The constitutive EPC
documents created this body; 18 it is the institutionalization of periodic meetings
of the highest representatives of the governments of the member states. The
European Council has become an extra-treaty entity through which the leaders
of the member states oversee the workings of the Community institutions, in
particular the process of decisionmaking within the Council of the European

14 For a more de1ailed explanation of the workings of EPC, see Murphy, supra note 5, at 383-96;
Stein, supra note 5, at 60-78; and Von der Gablentz, supra note 5, at 688-95
15 See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
16 In 1987, for example, the member slates reaffirmed their position that rapid withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Afghanistan was an essential pre-condition for an end to that conflict. See 20 BuLL. EuR.
COMM. (No. 3) 80 (1987). The member slates called for a political solution which guaranteed the
Afghan people's right to self-determination. Id. The member slates also endorsed the Central American
peace plan put forth by President Arias of Cosla Rica. See 20 BuLL. EuR. CoMM. (No.6) 102 (1986);
20 BULL. EuR. CoMM. (No. 11) 87 (1987). In 1986, the member slates reaffirmed their condemnation
of terrorism and agreed to intensify their common effort to combat it. See 19 But.t.. Eun. CoMM. (No.
1) 60 (1986). The member slates also issued a common slatement on human rights. See 19 BULL. EuR.
Comt. (No.7) 100 (1986). More recently, in 1989, the Community nations all agreed to simultaneously
withdraw their envoys from Iran to protest death threats made by the Ayatollah Khomeini against
Salman Rushdie, author of the novel The Sata11ic Ver.res. See Europeam Recall Envoys from Iran over
Rushdie Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
17 Perhaps one reason for the integration that has laken place so far within the Community is that
emphasis has been placed on economic rather than political issues. See D. LAsoK, THE LAw OF THE
ECONOMY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 385-477 (1980); D. l..ASOK &j. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at5.
18 Paris Communique, supra note 11. See generally Lauwaars, The European Council, 14 CoMMON MKT.
L. REV. 25 (1977).
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Communities. The European Council is also responsible for providing the
impetus behind the EPC process. 19
The heads of state and government meet as the European Council four times
a year. 20 Also, the foreign ministers of the member states, or their representatives, meet as the Council of the European Communities to consider EEC
matters. These same ministers can continue their meeting and consider foreign
affairs matters as the European Council. The President of the Council of the
European Communities, a position which rotates between the member states
every six months, is the spokesperson for the European Council in EPC matters.21 In this capacity, the President is responsible for responding to questions
in EPC matters put by the Parliament of the European Communities (Parliament) and for submitting annual statements to Parliament on EPC matters.22
The Commission of the European Communities (Commission) participates in
EPC through its attendance at all ministerial EPC meetings, and it is represented
at meetings of the Political Committee.23 The Commission has no vote on EPC
matters. 24 Although formally separate from the Community, EPC is an integral
part of EEC activity. This is evident from the Commission's participation in the
EPC process and from the fact that public announcement of EPC results are
contained in official EEC documents. 25

III. ORIGINS

OF

TITLE III AND THE SEA

Although there is no consensus as to what political European union means,
the notion of such a union is by no means new. 26 The SEA is only the most
recent effort at facilitating a European union. During the past several years,
there have been numerous proposals advancing the concept of a political Eu-

19 See generally CoMMITTEE OF THE THREE TO THE EuROPEAN CouNCIL, REPORT ON EuROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 15 (1979) [hereinafter THREE WISE MEN'S REPORT]; Duff, The Report of the Three Wise Men,
19 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 237, 241-51 (1980-1981); D. LAsoK & ]. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 210-14; P.
MATHIJSEN, supra note 5, at 33-35; Lauwaars, supra note 18, at 25-31; Murphy, supra note 5, at 38688; Stein, supra note 5, at 63; Von der Gablentz, supra note 5, at 386-88.
20 Copenhagen Report, supra note 10, at 15.
21Paris Communique, supra note 11, at 7.
22 Luxembourg Report, supra note 8, at 12; Copenhagen Report, supra note 10, at 17; Paris Communique,
supra note 11, at 7.
2' See generally Murphy, supra note 5, at 391; Stein, supra note 5, at 67-68.
2• Stein, supra note 5, at 67.
25 Every issue of the monthly Bulletin of the European Communities contains a section on EPC
activities, and the annual General Report on the Activities of the European Communities summarizes
the positions and statements of the member states on EPC matters.
26 See HousE OF LORDS SELECT CoMMITTEE ON THE EuROPEAN CoMMUNITIES, FOURTEENTH REPORT
ON EuROPEAN UNIFICATION H.L. 226 at x-xii (1985) [hereinafter HOUSE OF LORDS REPORT]; D. I..ASOK
&]. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 27.
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ropean union.27 In fact, at one point, the government leaders from the member
states set European union as a goal to be achieved by the end of the 1970s. 28
The Parliament, especially after the direct election of its members began in
1979, repeatedly expressed frustration about the slow development of the EEC
into a political institution. 29 In 1981, two member states, Germany and Italy,
presented a Draft European Act80 which would have empowered the European
Council to be the controlling political organ within a unified Europe. In response, the European Council issued the Solemn Declaration on European
Union (Solemn Declaration).31 This statement accepted the goal of political
union, but imposed no obligation on the member states to work toward that
goal. Moreover, the Solemn Declaration envisioned a union within the framework of the EEC Treaty.32
Two distinct approaches toward political unification were advocated. One
approach was to achieve union through the Community; albeit through a Community with improved and more responsive decisionmaking institutions.33 This
approach suggested that the European Council assume a more active role in
coordinating the workings of the EEC institutions and political cooperation.
The European Council would be the paramount institution within the European
union. The other approach despaired of political unification through the Community and advocated unification by agreements and institutions outside the
EEC. 34
The Solemn Declaration convinced Parliament of the futility of attempting
to achieve political union through intergovernmental negotiations. 35 Parliament
proceeded to draft its own unification proposal, the Draft Treaty Establishing

T1 Tindemans Report, 9 BuLL. EuR. COMM. (Supp. 10) 1 (1976); THREE WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra note
19; Draft European Act, reprinted in, DIGEST OF THE INSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY
BETWEEN 1950 AND 1982, at 460 (1982) (published by the Committee on Institutional Affairs of the
European Parliament) [hereinafter Draft European Act]; Draft Treaty Establishing the European
Union, 27 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. C 77) 33 (1984) [hereinafter Draft Treaty]; see generally Glaesner,
supra note l, at 446-48.
28 See Statement at the Conclusion of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Member Stales
of the European Community, reprinted in, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES, SIXTH GENERAL
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1972, at 6 (1973).
29 See, e.g., 25 OJ. EuR. CoMM. (No. C 66) 67-71 (1982); 25 OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. C II) 191-93
(1982).
so See Draft European Act, supra note 27.
SI Solemn Declaration, supra note 13.
32 See DeZwaan, The Single Europe Act: Conclusion of a Unique Document, 23 CoMMON MKT. L. Rt:v.
747, 748 (1986).
ss See Ti11demans Report, supra note 27; THREE WISE MEN's REPORT, supra note 19; Solemn Declaration,
supra note 13.
S4 See Draft Treaty, supra note 27; Draft European Act, supra note 27.
ss See F. CAPOTORTI, M. HILF, F. jACOBS & P. jACQUt, THE EUROPEAN UNION TREATY, COMMENTARY
ON THE DRAFT ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 10 (1986) (hereinafter F. CAPOTORTI].

1989]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

341

the European Union (Draft Treaty). 36 This Draft Treaty, which Parliament
adopted in 1984, did not amend the EEC Treaty nor did it contemplate European union within the framework of the EEC Treaty. Instead, the Draft
Treaty supplants the EEC Treaty. The Draft Treaty took as its starting point
the Community patrimony or acquis communautaire. This single, coherent document incorporates the institutions of the Community, modifies their roles and
procedures, and adds certain extra-Community activities such as EPC. 37 Not
surprisingly, the Draft Treaty would have dramatically increased the legislative
power of Parliament at the expense of the European Council.38
The Draft Treaty proposed a federalist type of union among the EEC member
states. It conferred a common citizenship on people of the signatory states and
provided protection for certain fundamental human rights. For these reasons,
the Draft Treaty would have impinged on the sovereignty of the member states
to a greater extent than the EEC Treaty. 39
This bold attempt at unification was clear evidence of Parliament's frustration
at the pace which the member states were working toward the stated objective
of European unification. Needless to say, the Draft Treaty was controversial.40
Nevertheless, the national legislatures of six member states (there were ten at
the time) endorsed the Draft Treaty.41 Because of its rather extreme provisions
and the adoption of the SEA, the Draft Treaty has not been, and probably will
not be, ratified by the member states. It has had the salutary effect, however,
of prompting further action by the member states.
Indeed, the Solemn Declaration preceded the Draft Treaty by about seven
months. In the Solemn Declaration, the government leaders meeting as the
European Council pledged to create a united Europe. They acknowledged that
the "European idea" which had achieved economic integration through the EEC
was the wish of the European people. 42 These statements by the European
Council were made with the Draft Treaty and the Draft European Act in mind.
They are certainly an endorsement of a political European union, but they
demonstrate that the European Council contemplated union through the EEC.43
The fact that the SEA was drafted and adopted within only two years of

Draft Treaty, supra note 27.
See generally F. CAPOTORTI, supra note 35, at 15-20.
sa !d. at 88-89; R. B•IEBER, J. jACQUt & J. WEILER, AN EvER CLOSER UNION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE DRAFT TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN UNION 37-40 (1985) (hereinafter EVER CLOSER
UNION].
S9 See EVER CLOSER UNION, supra note 38, at 127-41.
40 See, e.g., EVER CLOSER UNION, supra note 38, at 37-40; HoUSE OF LORDS REPORT, supra note 26.
41 The nationa11egislatures from Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and West Germany
endorsed the Draft Treaty. D. LAsoK &J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 25.
42 Solemn Declaration, supra note 13, at preamble.
45 See DeZwaan, supra note 32, at 747.
:!6
S7
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Parliament's approval of the Draft Treaty is evidence that the member states
viewed the Draft Treaty seriously.
The European Council's reaction to the Draft Treaty was the appointment
of an Ad Hoc Committee for Institutional Affairs (Dooge Committee).44 The
report of this committee (Dooge Report) suggested improvements in cooperation, both within the EEC and in EPC. 45 The Dooge Report did not criticize the
Draft Treaty. It acknowledged the stagnation that had crept into EEC decisionmaking and noted that Europe faced challenges from other nations and from
relatively high levels of unemployment within the member states. As a means
of meeting these challenges, the Dooge Report stated that the member states
must "launch a new venture-establishment of a political entity ...."46 It recommended the convocation of a conference by the member states to negotiate
a draft treaty on European union, based on the objectives and methods set out
in the Report and the Solemn Declaration. In a somewhat surprising endorsement of the Draft Treaty, the Dooge Report urged that the negotiations should
be "guided by the spirit and method of the Draft Treaty voted by the European
Parliament."47 Finally, the Report recommended several structural changes to
the EPC process, most of which were carried over into title III of the Single
Act. 48
Events moved very quickly thereafter. The Dooge Committee's final report
was submitted in March 1985, and the SEA was signed less than a year later in
February 1986.4 9 The Luxembourg government became President of the Council of the European Communities in July 1985 and proposed amending the
EEC Treaty as a means of effecting the Dooge Report recommendations. The
Council of the European Communities accepted the recommendations and
agreed to call a conference of member state representatives to consider drafting
amendments to the EEC Treaty. This conference opened in September 1985.
A working party comprised of representatives to the conference and from
the Commission was assigned to draft revisions to the EEC Treaty. The Political
Committee of the European Council was assigned to draft provisions regarding
EPC. The resulting title III is, in part, a restatement of the EPC mechanisms
that had been established by prior declarations of the European Council and
44

REPORT OF THE An Hoc COMMITTEE FOR lNSTITtrriONAL AFFAIRS TO THE EUROPEAN CoUNCIL,

reprinted in, HOUSE OF LORDS REPORT, supra note 26, at app. 4 [hereinafter DoOGE REPORT]. See a/.ro
Glaesner, supra note I, at 448.
45

DOOGE REPORT, supra note 44, at app. 4.

I d. at lxviii.
47 !d. at lxxvii.

<6

48 The Dooge Report also recommended that decisions of the Council of the European Communities
be by qualified or simple majority and that Parliament be assigned an increased role in the decisionmaking process. Both of these reforms are contained to some extent in title II of the SEA.
49 For an extensive discussion of the history of the drafting of the SEA, see DeZwaan, supra note
32.
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had evolved over fifteen years of operation. The working party obtained agreement easily on these points. On other portions of title III, including some of
its more important provisions, the working party was unable to achieve agreement.50
Perhaps it is no surprise, but Parliament's direct role in the drafting of the
SEA was minimal. It delivered an opinion supporting the calling of the conference,51 but it was not involved at all in the drafting of the text.52

IV. EuROPEAN PoLITICAL CooPERATION AITER THE SEA
The resulting document-the SEA-is simply a set of amendments to the
EEC Treaty and a new set of EPC procedures, both of which contribute to
European unification. It is not a unification document as is the Draft Treaty.
Nevertheless, Parliament's objective of increasing its own power and integrating
EPC into the institutional structure are included in the SEA, although not to
the extent Parliament would have preferred.53 While Parliament expressed
reservations on many aspects of the SEA, it did not reject the document, as
some had feared.!H
It has been argued that the inclusion of title III within the SEA, a document
which othenvise simply amends the EEC Treaty, was purely a political compromise. 55 It is true that great care was taken to keep title III separate from the
rest of the SEA.56 Title III, however, certainly is not unrelated to the rest of
the SEA, and its objectives clearly fit into the overall purpose of the SEA.
Perhaps the first significant point about EPC, as restated in title III, is that
the system is now embodied in an international agreement. Prior to the SEA,
the articulation of EPC principles and processes was in declarations and communiques issued after various European Council meetings. While these documents represented commitments of the member states, they were not legally
binding agreements. After the enactment of the SEA, these EPC principles now
have the force of international obligations and, as such, are enforceable as a

50

See DeZwaan, supra note 32, at 757.
Resolution, 28 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. C 229) 29 (1985).
52 See Bieber, Pantalis & Schoo, supra note 3, at 768.
5S ld.
5i Resolution, 29 OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. C 33) 119 (1986); see also DeZwaan, supra note 32, at 761.
Parliament passed additional resolutions voting to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by
the SEA even though its preferred version of European union was not achieved. Resolution, 29 O.J.
EuR. COMM. (No. C 120) 96 (1986).
55 Glaesner, supra note 1, at 453. The name "Single" European Act does not refer so much to the
idea of a single, unified Europe as it does to one act containing two separate sets of provisions which
for political purposes are contained in one document.
56 See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
51 See
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matter of international law. 5 7 A separate issue, however, may remain: whether
the common actions agreed upon by the European Council through EPC are
themselves legally enforceable.58 But clearly the EPC process, and the member
states' obligation to participate in that process, is now a matter of international
obligation.
The second significant point, and somewhat related to the first, is the status
given to the European Council. Article 2 of title I of the SEA provides that the
"European Council shall bring together the Heads of State or of Government
of the Member States and the President of the Commission of the European
Communities."59 By this provision, the existence of the European Council is
likewise now established by treaty.
Third, the SEA greatly enhances the status and role of the Commission in
EPC. The Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports urged the involvement of the
Commission in EPC matters, particularly when the issues affected the Community.60 Title I, however, envisions the Commission as a full partner in EPC
deliberations and decisionmaking.
This status of the Commission is carried over into title III. Article 30(3)(a)
provides that the ministerial meetings constituting the EPC framework are
meetings of the foreign ministers and a member of the Commission. 61 Inclusion
of the Commission at the ministerial meetings assures full participation in EPC.
This point is reinforced in the next section, article 30(3)(b), which states that
the "Commission sha~ be fully associated with the proceedings of Political
Cooperation."62 The C'ommission is also charged with maintaining the consistency between policies agreed on in EPC and the external policies of the EEC.
The President of the Council of the Communities, in his capacity as Presidency

57 See Freestone & Davidson, Community Competence and Part Ill of the Single European Act, 23 CoMM.
MKT. L REv. 793, 796 (1986). As to the legal status of title III within the legal system of the European
Communities, see infra notes 99-102, 107-09 and accompanying text.
58 In 1982, for example, the dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina regarding the
Falkland Islands was extensively considered within the Community and EPC. As an EPC matter, the
member states agreed to prohibit the export of arms and military equipment to Argentina. See
Community Solidarity in the Faulkland Islands Conflict, 15 Buu. EuR. Co MM. (No.4) 7-8 (1982). The SEA
does not speak to the issue of whether member states refusing to abide by a similar measure would
now be in breach of an international obligation.
59 SEA, supra note 1, at title I, art. 2.
60 Luxembourg Report, supra note 8, at 12; Copenhagen Report, supra note 10, at 18. The President and
members of the Commission were permitted to attend EPC meetings, and the Deputy Secretary
General represented the Commission at meetings of the Political Committee. See Stein, supra note 5,
at 67-68.
~ 1 SEA, supra note 1, at title III, art. 30(3)(a); Edward, supra note 3, at 29.
62 SEA, supra note 1, at title III, art. 30(3)(b). Presumably, the Commission's full association carries
with it a vote on EPC matters. Under the earlier EPC system, the Commission did not have this right.
Stein, supra note 5, at 67.
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of EPC, and the Commission are jointly charged with maintaining this consistency.63
Structurally, the SEA provides that EPC is to be conducted, for the most part,
as it has in the past. Title I, article 3(2) provides that the provisions of title III
confirm and supplement the procedures agreed to by the Luxembourg, Copenhagen, and London Reports; the Solemn Declaration; and the practices gradually established by the members. Article 3(2) states that the institutions and
bodies responsible for EPC shall exercise their powers and jurisdiction under
the terms of title III and the documents referred to in title I, article 1. These
provisions incorporate the mentioned documents by reference and may elevate
them to the status of international agreements.
Although the status of the European Council is elevated in title III, its role
is left entirely unstated. Both the proposals for intra-Community and extraCommunity unification called for significant involvement of the European
Council as a supervisory and coordinating body. 64 Under the SEA, however, the
European Council is assigned no role. It is merely to meet as such twice a year. 65
Even this is a reduction from the four meetings a year called for in the Paris
Communique. This reduction reflects the concern that member states not view
the European Council as simply another Community institution dealing with
day-to-day business. Instead, the European Council should play a strategic role
and give direction and political impetus to the Community.66 The foreign ministers, or their representatives, however, are to meet at least four times a year,
and they may meet to discuss foreign policy matters during meetings of the
Council of the European Communities.67
The remaining structural provisions for EPC are contained in title III. The
President of the Council of the European Communities shall also be the "Presidency of European Political Cooperation."68 The role of the Presidency remains
largely unchanged. The role of the Presidency is to initiate action, coordinate
the EPC process, and represent the member states regarding EPC in relations
with non-Community countries.69 The Presidency is responsible for managing
political cooperation and organizing the periodic meetings. 70 Title III creates a
Political Committee comprised of the political directors from the foreign min-

SEA, supra note 1, at title III, art. 30(5).
See supra note 33-38 and accompanying text.
65 SEA, supra note 1, at title I, art. 2.
66 DoDGE REPORT, supra note 44, at lxxv; Ever Closer Union, supra note 38, at 337; Solemn Declaration,
supra note 13, at 25-26; see also D. LAsoK &J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 213.
67 SEA, supra note 1, at title I, art. 3(a).
63 /d. at title Ill, art. 30(10)(a).
69 /d. at title III, art. 30(10)(b). The Presidency is also the spokesperson for EPC generally.
70 Id.
63
64
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istries of the member states and requires that the Com,mittee meet regularly. 71
The Political Committee's function remains essentially unchanged: to prepare
for the ministerial meetings and to maintain ongoing business ofEPC. 72 Further,
title III creates a group of European Correspondents, under the direction of
the Political Committee, to monitor the implementation of EPC policies. 73 Title
III also authorizes working groups to work under the direction of the Political
Committee and on tasks specifically assigned to it. 74
A significant structural change is the creation of a permanent secretariat
based in Brussels to assist the Presidency in EPC activities. 75 The lack of permanent staff for EPC had long been a source of concern. 76 Previously, the
system of EPC relied primarily on the foreign office of the member state serving
as President of the Council of the European Communities. This was a hardship
especially for the smaller countries. 77
Although title II of the SEA significantly enhances the role of Parliament in
the EEC's legislative process, its involvement in EPC has not been increased. In
title III, the signatories commit to ensuring that Parliament be "closely associated
with ... [EPC]."78 This provision strengthens Parliament's role in the EPC
process to the extent that title III is legally binding. 79 The specifics of the
consultation procedures in title III, however, may result in an actual diminution
of Parliament's role.
Article 30(4) of title III requires the Presidency to regularly inform Parliament
of the foreign policy issues examined in EPC and to insure that its views are
taken into consideration. Title III, however, does not specify the means by
which such consultation is to take place. Under the previous procedures, the
Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports specifically called for periodic meetings
between the foreign ministers and the Political Committee of Parliament. At
the meetings, the parties discussed policy matters and received Parliament's
proposals as a means of involving Parliament in the process. 80 The Copenhagen
Report also required the Presidency to submit a report annually to Parliament
71 The Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports required meetings at least quarterly. In fact, the
Committee members meet much more frequently, at least monthly. See Stein, supra note 5, at 64.
72 SEA, supra note I, at tide III, an. 30(10)(c).
73 !d. at tide Ill, an. 30(10)(e).
74 !d. at tide III, art. 30(IO)(f).
75 !d. at title III, art. 30(10)(g).
76 See, e.g., A Report on European Political Cooperation and the Role of the European Parliament, 19811982 EuR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-335) 48-52 (1981) [hereinafter Report on European Political Cooperation].
77 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 390.
7S SEA, supra note 1, at title III, an. 30(4).
79 See Bieber, Pantalis & Schoo, supra note 3, at 786-87. How Parliament can enforce this right,
however, is unclear. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
80 The Luxembourg Report called for these meetings two times a year. Luxembourg Report, supra note
8, at 12. The Copenhagen Reports increased the number to four a year. Copenhagen Report, supra note
10, at 17. See Lauwaars, supra note 18, at 30.
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on political cooperation.81 Parliament debated this annual report and the Presidency was to reply to the debate.82 In addition, the Presidency was to submit
to questioning by Parliament on EPC. 83
Article 1 of title I provides that political cooperation shall be governed by
title III. The provisions of title III are said to "confirm and supplement the
procedures agreed to in the reports of Luxembourg, . . . Copenhagen, ...
London, ... and the Solemn Declaration."84 Using this incorporation technique,
the periodic meetings and the annual report of the Presidency called for in the
Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports can ensure that the views of the Parliament be taken into consideration, as title III requires. Parliament's questioning
of the Presidency can also serve a useful oversight role. 85 It is unclear, however,
whether this procedure is required any longer. It is not expressly provided for
in title III. Curiously, the Paris Communique, which did call for it, is not one
of the documents referred to in title I as being the basis of EPC.
V. THE IMPACT

OF

THE SEA oN EuROPEAN PoLITICAL CooPERATION

The working procedures of title III continue the EPC mechanism whereby a
common foreign policy can be pursued. The provisions of title III, however,
do more than restate past EPC procedures.
A.

Commitment to a Common European Foreign Policy

The first subsection of article 30 contains a broad commitment by the signatories to use the EPC procedures for foreign affairs issues. It states that the
parties "being members of the European Community, shall endeavor to jointly
formulate and implement a European foreign policy."86 One might dismiss this
provision as noncommittal-as being merely an agreement to attempt a joint
European foreign policy. The sections of article 30 which follow demonstrate
that this is not just hortatory rhetoric. Through these sections, the signatories
more specifically obligate themselves to arrive at common policies.
There is, moreover, an interesting implication of the broad, somewhat ephemeral commitment in article 30(1). It is a more affirmative commitment to a
common foreign policy than was expressed previously in the EPC documents
listed in article 1, and it shows an evolution in the EPC process. The Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports seem to be premised on the notion of consistent
Copenhagen Report, supra note 10, at 17.
Report on European Political Cooperation, supra note 76, at 43.
83 Paris Communique, supra note 11, at 7.
84 SEA, supra note 1, at title I, art. I.
85 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 393-94; Stein, supra note 5, at 68-69.
ss SEA, supra note 1, title Ill, art. 30(1).
Bl
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national foreign policy positions which fostered a political union. 87 Article 30(1)
takes this point further; it commits the signatories to attempt a common European foreign policy.
Articles 30(2)(a) and (b) of title III require consultation and coordination on
the same basis as the Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports. The signatories
agree in these sections to inform and consult with each other on foreign policy
matters of general interest before deciding on final positions. Articles 30(2)(c)
and (d), however, take these consultation procedures further. Before adopting
final positions, the signatories must take into account the position of the other
signatories and the desirability of adopting a common policy.88 The signatories,
moreover, must agree to avoid taking positions which weaken the efficacy of
the European unit-the Community-in international affairs or within international organizations. 89 Hence, the signatories agree positively to attempt a
common policy and agree negatively to avoid any unilateral policies which might
diminish the standing of the Community. The signatories carry over these same
commitments to their activities as members of international organizations or
participants in international conferences. In each they agree to take common
positions on issues germane to EPC. 90
While these provisions do not require the signatories to reach common positions, they do require some affirmative action to attempt common actions.
The obligation to attempt common action is implicit in the language "shall
endeavor," which is repeated throughout the SEA. Also, article 30(3)(c) requires
the signatories to take specific actions to reach the goal of common action.
Article 30(3)(c) goes further than the prior EPC documents by providing that,
in order to "ensure swift adoption of common positions and the implementation
of joint action, the High Contracting Parties shall, as far as possible, refrain from
impeding the formulation of a consensus and the joint actions this could produce." 91
This obligation is designed as a fairly strong-armed technique for consensus
building. It requires the signatories to yield their different national positions in
favor of consensus, "as far as possible." One might quickly focus on the qualifying phrase "as far as possible" and conclude that this provision really adds
nothing and imposes no additional obligation on the signatories. If the member
87 The Luxembourg Report urges a coordination of positions, and common action when possible
and desirable. Luxembourg Report, supra note 8, at 11. The Copenhagen Report requires the signatories
to consult on foreign policy matters and not to take final positions until such consultation. Copenhagen
Report, supra note 10, at 17-18. In the Paris Communique, the Heads of State and Government
committed themselves to gradually adopting common positions and to coordinate their diplomatic
activities in matters affecting the interests of the European Communities. Paris Communiqul, supra note
11, at 7.
88 SEA, supra note 1, at title III, art. 30(2)(c).
89 !d. at title Ill, art. 30(2)(d).
90 !d. at title Ill, arts. 30(7)(a), (7)(b).
91 !d. at title III, art. 30(3)(c).
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states are of the same mind, then there is consensus; if not, presumably it is for
some serious internal reason, and hence consensus is neither possible nor required. This reading, however, seems to be too perfunctory.
Article 30(3)(c) presumes consensus and common action. Any member state
failing to accede to the majority bears the burden of demonstrating, if challenged, that its failure to yield is not possible. Hence, the "as far as possible"
exception seems to be precisely that, a narrow exception from consensus for
circumstances out of the ordinary. The formulation of this obligation in article
30(3)(c) implies that blocking consensus is not presumed to be the usual state
of behavior. In article 30(3)(c), the signatories appear to add substance, rather
than mere rhetoric, to the goal of a common European foreign policy.92

B. Separation of EPC and the Community
The SEA carefully separated the Community, on the one hand, and EPC, on
the other. This separation is clear in at least three respects within the SEA. It

92 It is interesting to consider article 30(3)(c) in relation to the amendments to the EEC Treaty in
title II which allow for voting by qualified majority. !d. at title II, arts. 6, 7. This reform was intended
to dilute the effect of consensus voting under the so-called Luxembourg Accords and to eliminate the
stagnation in Community affairs which resulted from it. See HousE OF LoRDs REPORT, supra note 26,
at xvii-xx; D. LAsoK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 205-10; P. MATHUSEN, supra note 5, at 30-32. In
contrast, article 30(c)(30) encourages consensus building.
From the outset, the EEC Treaty has provided for qualified majority voting by the Council on most
measures. In the mid-1960's, a crisis occurred which had the effect of paralyzing the Council as a
decision making body. Relations between France and the other five member states became strained.
In 1965, during the Council Presidency of France, certain measures vital to the Community were not
adopted because of France's opposition and its control of the timetable for adoption. For seven months
thereafter France refused to participate in Council activities. This stalemate was broken at an informal
Council meeting in Luxembourg. The understanding reached there was that when voting by qualified
majority was allowed and the matter affected very important interests of the members, the Council
would endeavor to reach a unanimously acceptable solution. France ntaintained that discussion on the
topic must continue until unanimity was reached. See Luxembourg Accords printed in CoMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINTH GENERAL REPoRT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNmES
31-33 (1966); HoUSE OF LORDS REPORT, supra note 26, at xix; D. LASOK & j. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at
205-06. This understanding did not constitute an amendment to the EEC Treaty and is thought to
be legally invalid. See D. LAseK &J. BRIDGE, supra note 3, at 207. As a consequence of these Accords,
the Council did not resolve many important matters.
In 1974, the Heads of State and Government announced that is necessary to renounce the practice
of requiring unanimity for all decisions. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNmES, EiGHTH
GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1974, at 298 (1975). The reformed voting provisions in title II reinforce the notion that qualified majority, not unanimous, voting
is encouraged. These provisions of title II amend the voting procedures to reduce from unanimity to
qualified majority the votes necessary for approval of certain measures. See D. LAseK & J. BRIDGE,
supra note 3, at 209.
On the other hand, the aim of article 30(c)(3) is to force consensus. If consensus is achieved, common
action can be taken. The paralysis of the Council resulting from the Luxembourg Accords was the
result of a lack of consensus.
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is also clear that the separation is more formal than real and that functionally
there is little separation.
First, article 3 of title I sets out separate bases for the authority and jurisdiction
of the Community institutions and for EPC. Article 3(1) states that the EEC
institutions exercise their powers and jurisdiction under the EEC Treaty as
amended by title II of the SEA. Article 3(2) states that the institutions and
bodies responsible for EPC exercise their power and jurisdiction according to
title III and the documents referred to in article 1. 93 Thus, article 3(1) purports
to confine the conduct and activities of Community institutions to those set forth
in the EEC Treaty while article 3(2) lists the documents governing EPC. Article
3(1) does not, however, remove EPC from the Community.
Second, the signatories in titles I, II, and IV are referred to as member states.
This is consistent with the notion that these titles amend the EEC Treaty. In
contrast, throughout title III the signatories are referred to as "High Contracting Parties."94 This distinction highlights the separation of EPC from the Community order.
Article 3(2) and article 30, however, do not divorce EPC from the Community.
Within title III, the signatories, as independent contracting parties, acknowledge
their relationship to the Community. Article 30(1) refers to the "High Contracting Parties, being members of the European Community ... .''95 The reference
to High Contracting Parties is typical in treaties and reinforces the concept that
the agreements regarding EPC in title III constitute international commitments.
It may also be construed as a statement that these commitments are separate
from the Community order. 96 Within article 30(1), however, the signatories
acknowledge their relationship to the Community. They refer to themselves as
"members of the European Community."97 More importantly, the signatories
make the commitments of title III as such. 98

SEA, supra note I, at title I, art. 3(2).
See id. at title Ill, art. 30. One exception is in Article 30(IO)(b) in which the Presidency is charged
with the responsibility of initiating action and "coordinating and representing the positions of the
Member Stales in relations with third countries." Jd. at title Ill, art. 30(10)(b) (emphasis added). Former
European Court Judge Pierre Pescatore is critical, among other things, of the draftsmanship of the
SEA. Judge Pescatore refers to it as "the worst piece of drafting I have come across in my practice of
European Affairs •..." Pescatore, supra note I, at I5. Judge Pescatore is especially critical of the
drafting because it in large part amends the EEC Treaty which he regards as being very precisely
drafted. I d.
95 SEA, supra note I, at title Ill, art. 30(I).
96 The negotiations leading up to the SEA and the drafting of the several titles shows this separateness
as well. The intergovernmental conference drafted titles I, II, and IV. The Political Committee of the
European Council drafted title Ill. See DeZwaan, supra note 32, at 747-60.
97 SEA, supra note I, at title Ill, art. 30(1).
98 Jd. Article 30(I) reads in its entirety: "The High Contracting Parties, being members of the
European Communities, shall endeavorjointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy."
93

94

Jd.
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Third, title IV, article 31 contains perhaps the most significant effort to
separate EPC from the Community. This article states that the jurisdiction of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (European Court) shall
apply only to title II, the title amending the EEC Treaty, and to article 32.99
This provision purports to separate EPC and title III from the Community
legal order. 10°Consequently, although title III sets forth a series of international
obligations, these obligations and procedures are not incorporated into or en~
forceable within the Community legal order. Likewise, the European Council,
which article 3 of title I establishes as a legal personality, is not incorporated
into the Community legal order.
Title III, however, is replete with language creating obligations. Most of its
provisions state that the High Contracting Parties "shall" do certain things. 101
If these obligations are not enforceable within the Community legal order, the
signatories have recourse to other fora of international dispute resolution. 102
C. Role of the Commission in EPC

The purported bright line between the European Communities, on the one
hand, and EPC, on the other, places the Commission in an ambiguous position.
In turn, this ambiguity undercuts the separation of EPC from the Communities.
The Commission is purely a Community institution. In contrast, the European
Council, although consisting of the same members as the Council of the European Community, is at least formally separate from the Community. 103 Under
title I, article 2 and title III (neither of which are subject to the jurisdiction of
the European Court) the Commission is assigned a significant role in EPC. The
Commission is a full member of the European Council (article 2(1)) and participates in the EPC process (article 30(3)(b)). Also, the Commission is required
along with the Presidency of EPC to assure that the external policies of the

99 I d. at title III, art. 32. Article 32 provides that, subject to article 3(1) (title II) and article 31,
nothing in the SEA affects the treaties establishing the European Communities or other treaties
modifying or supplementing them. Id.
100 See Glaesner, supra note 1, at 451; Freestone & Davidson, supra note 57, at 796.
101 For example, article 30(1) provides that the parties "shall endeavor jointly to formulate and
implement a European foreign policy." SEA, supra note 1, at art. 30(1). Article 30(3)(c) states that the
parties "shall, as far as possible, refrain from ... impeding the formation of a consensus and joint
action ...." Id. at art. 30(3)(c). Article 30(8) provides that the parties "shall organize" a dialogue with
third countries. Id. at art. 30(8).
102 Freestone & Davidson, supra note 57, at 797. The authors suggest that title III might also be
enforceable in the national courts of those signatories which accept treaties as directly part of their
national legal systems, such as Germany. It is not clear how other signatories would have standing to
raise title Ill issues in those national systems or what rights title III confers on citizens which could
be raised in those courts.
103 See Murphy, supra note 5, at 390.
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Community and EPC are consistent. 104 By these provisions, the signatories have
expanded the role and authority of the Commission, and they have assigned
the Commission certain additional responsibilities within the EPC process. This
institution, which before had been purely a creature of the EEC Treaty, is now
assigned extra-Community activities. 105 By virtue of article 31, however, the
Commission's EPC activities apparently are not reviewable by the European
Court.
What, if any, review of the Commission's role in EPC exists is unclear. Although, by reason of article 31, title III is not incorporated into Community
law, it does contain a series of international obligations. The Commission, however, is neither an international person, 106 nor is it a signatory of the SEA.
Consequently, it is difficult to see how the obligations of title III can be enforced
against a recalcitrant Commission.l07
The corollary legal issues regarding the Commission's involvement in EPC
are similarly difficult. Title I and title III require action on the part of the
Commission. Assume a member state or other Community institution believes
a particular action by the Commission, or participation of the Commission as a
general matter, is outside its authority. The basis for judicial review of such
conduct is difficult to articulate. The SEA appears to give the Commission an
extra-treaty role. The rules of the EEC Treaty are not applicable to review the
Commission's discharge of these responsibilities.
Certainly, if in performing its obligations under title III, the Commission
were to violate some provision of the EEC Treaty or other Community law, the
European Court could review the Commission's action and find it prohibited
by Treaty authority. 108 There is no provision in the EEC Treaty, however, stating
that the Commission is limited to the authority granted to it by the EEC
Treaty. 109 Consequently, it may be possible for the Commission to perform its
104 SEA, supra note I, art. 30(5). Article 30(5) obligates the Presidency of EPC and the Commission
to assure consistency between the external policies of the Community and EPC. It requires each to
discharge this obligation "within its own sphere of competence.'' !d. Article 30(3)(b), however, which
inserts the Commission into the EPC process, is not so limited.
105 See supra notes 59-63, 105 and accompanying text
106 While the Community itself enjoys a type of international personality, its institutions do not.
Algera v. Common Assembly, 1956-57 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 39; D. LAsoK &J. BRIDGE, supra note 3,
at 34.
107 Under article 30(4), the Presidency is also required to inform regularly the Parliament of the
issues being examined within the EPC and to insure that Parliament's views are taken into consider·
ation. But it is unclear how the European Parliament, which similarly is not an international person
or signatory, can enforce its right to participate in the EPC process.
108 See generaUy T. HARTLEY, THE FoUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, 335-37 (2d. ed,
1988).
.
109 Article 4(1) of the EEC Treaty lists the institutions of the Community, including the Commission,
and states that "[e]ach institution shall act within the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty.'' EEC
Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4(1).
This provision can be read in several ways. By one reading, it means that each institution when
discharging Community or Treaty activities shall act according to the EEC Treaty. This reading does
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title III role in a manner which is consistent with, or at least not in violation of,
its Community authority. Given the uncertainty of judicial review, the private
and perhaps public persuasion of the Council of the European Communities,
the European Council, or Parliament may be required either to force participation or to review excessive participation.
The question of the Community's foreign relations power is a very sensitive
one. In Commission v. Council (ERTA Case), 110 the European Court took the
position that the Community has the power to enter into international agreements and otherwise to engage in foreign relations over issues covered by part
I of the EEC Treaty. The member states have been concerned that this decision
allows the Community to aggregate power to itself at their expense.m One
reason for not incorporating title III into the Community legal order is that
same fear. To do so would give the Community-biased European Court the
opportunity to further extend the authority of the Community in foreign affairs.112 The lack of Community review of the Commission's activity within title
III, however, appears to allow for precisely that activism.
At one perhaps crucial point, title III does confine the Commission's role in
EPC. Article 30(5) charges the Presidency and the Commission, "each within its
own sphere of competence," 113 with maintaining consistency between the external policies of EPC and the Community. To the extent that the Commission
discharges this function, the Commission's authority seems to be limited by its
authority granted under the EEC Treaty. To avoid the uncertainties surrounding judicial review of the Commission's role in EPC, there might be a tendency
to consider all of the Commission's EPC activities as subsumed under this
section. The Commission's general participation in the EPC process, however,
is not limited by the language "within its competency." Further, the SEA appears

not negate the possibility of extra-Treaty responsibilities being assigned to a Community institution.
The provision can also be read to mean that every activity of the institution must be discharged
according to the EEC Treaty.
The signatories of the SEA certainly were not guided by this latter reading. They assigned the
Commission responsibilities and activities not mentioned in the EEC Treaty, and then they explicitly
stated in article 31 of the SEA that these activities are outside the Community legal order. The latter
reading of article 4(1) would preclude any Commission participation in the EPC process, since EPC is
specifically outside the EEC Treaty. This is clearly not what the signatories intended.
The Court of Justice of the European Community (European Court) has interpreted the powers of
Community institutions rather inclusively when discharging Community-related activities. The European Court has not limited the authority of the institutions to that which is explicitly stated in the
EEC Treaty. See, e.g., Casagrande v. Landes-haupstadt Munchen, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 773, 14
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 423 (1974); Commission v. Council (ERTA Case), 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263,
10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335 (1971) [hereinafter ERTA Case]. There are no Court cases as yet reviewing
the Commission's authority to engage in activities outside the Community order.
110 1971 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 263, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335 (1971).
Ill See Freestone & Davidson, supra note 57, at 799.
112[d.

m SEA, supra note 1, at title III, art. 30(5).
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to assign the Commission a much broader role than simply maintaining consistency of external positions.

D. Functional Realities of the New EPC

The role assigned to the Commission by title III, as well as the continuation
of past EPC practices, assures not only more interchange within the Community's institutions on EPC matters, but also significant involvement by the Community directly in the EPC decisions. Given this reality, it is difficult to maintain
that the Community and the EPC process are separate. The signatories have
acknowledged their desire for a political European union, and the Community
and EPC both have as an object "to contribute together to making concrete
progress towards European unity ...." 114 Why then have the signatories gone
to the extreme lengths referred to assure, at least on paper, that the two are
separate? Why not subsume EPC within the Community as has been previously
suggested? 115
The formal separation of the Community and EPC provides the member
states with several advantages. As a practical matter, the Community is deeply
involved in EPC. Yet the formal separation of the two gives the member states
the opportunity to deny the degree of unity which exists. A European foreign
policy directed by the Community would diminish the status and autonomy of
the member states. There may be a fear that the Community would become
too effective. To increase the sphere of Community competence and include
foreign affairs unrelated to the other Community activities could force a political
European union, or a more complete union, before the signatories are ready. 116
A second advantage of the formal separation is that EPC, including the
Commission's involvement, is outside the European Court and the qualified
voting provisions of the EEC Treaty. This may make it easier for the member.
states to handle contentious issues, especially if it is unclear whether they directly
relate to Community activities. If these difficult foreign policy issues are handled

SEA, supra note 1, at title I, art. I. See also Solemn Declaration, supra note 13, at 25-26.
See, e.g., Draft Treaty, supra note 27.
The unification consequences of many of the measures contemplated in the SEA are already
causing alarm within the Community. For example, the United Kingdom has expressed concern over
the notion of a single European currency and central bank. See Single European Currency 'Long Way
Off, The Times (London), July I, 1988, at 12, col. 4; EEC Rules Give Britain the Right to Veto Plan for
European Central Bank, The Times (London), July 2, 1988, at 7, col. 5, 10 col. I. The United Kingdom
has also reacted to a statement by the President of the Commission, M. Jacques Delors, that national
parliaments will have to give way to the embryo of a European government within seven years and to
the reality of the single European market after 1992. See Parliament 'Doomed' by European Government,
The Times (London), July 7, 1988, at l, col. 2; European Approaches, The Times (London), July II,
1988, at 15, col. I (editorial).
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within EPC, there is little risk that the EPC action will later be judged to be
beyond Community competence. 1 I7
VI.

CONCLUSION

The EPC process as discussed in this article has only recently been implemented. It is too early to know whether the process will work more efficiently
or differently than it did in the pre-SEA era. More importantly, perhaps, it is
too early to know whether the process will really contribute to the political
unification of Europe. The willingness of the member states to embody EPC in
a treaty and assign the Commission such an integral role in EPC, however,
attests to the potential the member states believe EPC possesses.
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